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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 8, 1999, in a matter of first impression, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Iadimarco v. Runyon1 resolved an intra-circuit dispute regarding what
standard of proof is necessary for non-minorities to prove that they have been the
victim of discrimination in the workplace based upon a protected trait.2 By
1

190 F.3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999).

2

In Iadimarco, a white male postal worker filed an employment discrimination claim
based upon race after his African American supervisor promoted a less qualified minority to a
position that Iadimarco had been under serious consideration for. 190 F.3d at 154. At the
time of the employment decision, Iadimarco was the only candidate who received a “superior”
rating in all job classifications. Id. at 164. The minority candidate was recruited after the
deadline for applications had passed and was never evaluated for the position. Id. Although
no formal affirmative action program was in place, a memo signed by an African American
manager directed supervisors to give “very serious consideration” to the issue of diversity
when making their employment decisions. Id. at 155.

579
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overturning the decision of the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals joined a growing number of circuits that
have rejected a long-standing method of evaluating evidence in employment
discrimination disputes based upon the societal status of the plaintiff.3
Despite the significant number of discrimination claims brought by nonminorities, federal circuit courts remain entrenched in a dispute over the appropriate
legal standard to apply when evaluating claims of “reverse discrimination.”4 The
inconsistency among circuits is self-evident in the following commentaries:
A plaintiff’s minority status by itself is sufficient in light of historical
practice in the workplace toward such socially disfavored groups, to give
rise to an inference of discriminatory motivation. White males, who as a
group historically have not been hindered in the workplace because of
their race or sex, are required to offer other particularized evidence, apart
from their race and sex, that suggests some reason why an employer might
discriminate against them.5
We have serious misgivings about the soundness of a test that imposes a
more onerous standard for plaintiffs who are white or male than for their
non-white or female counterparts.6
The Supreme Court has advanced the split among the circuits by failing to
directly address the issue of reverse discrimination.7 Nine years after the enactment
of Title VII, the Court established a framework designed to allocate the burdens of

3

See infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text discussing the inequality that results
when courts determine the standard of proof in employment discrimination claims on the basis
of minority or majority status as opposed to identifying whether a particular plaintiff is being
treated less favorably than others based upon a trait that is protected under Title VII.
4
A “traditional” employment discrimination claim involves bias against a person who is
identified as being a member of a historically disfavored group, such as an African American
or a woman. In contrast, a “reverse” employment discrimination claim involves bias against a
person who is identified as being a member of a group favored historically in employment,
such as a Caucasian or a male. Individuals in the former group are commonly referred to as
“minority” plaintiffs while individuals in the latter group are referred to as “majority”
plaintiffs. See generally Eric Matusewitch, Courts Split on Standard for Evaluating ‘Reverse’
Discrimination Claims, 13 No. 10 ANDREWS EMPLOYMENT LITIG. REP. 3 (March 23, 1999)
(observing that in fiscal year 1995, reverse discrimination complaints constituted 14% of the
approximately 30,000 race bias charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission).
5

Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

6

Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994).

7

Several Supreme Court rulings concerning the validity of voluntary affirmative action
programs offer a perspective into how the Court might address the standard of proof necessary
for a prima facie showing of reverse racial discrimination. See infra notes 145-160 and
accompanying text; see generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995);
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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proof in traditional employment discrimination cases.8 However, twenty-seven years
later the Supreme Court remains unresponsive to the rising variance among circuit
courts regarding the classification and treatment of plaintiffs in reverse employment
discrimination cases.9 As this country moves further away from the segregated
employment systems whose discriminatory effects provided the impetus for Title
VII, the lack of clearly defined protections for non-minority plaintiffs provides
crucial support to those who oppose anti-discrimination laws.
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court should resolve the inconsistency
within the federal system concerning the appropriate standard of proof in reverse
discrimination disputes by adopting the reasoning set forth by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals. Section II will profile the history and purpose of Title VII, with
emphasis on the “burden shifting” framework established by the Supreme Court to
analyze claims of racial discrimination in the workplace. Section III will contrast the
development of the “background circumstances” test applied by lower federal courts
to discrimination claims brought by majority plaintiffs with the Supreme Court’s
recognition of equal treatment for all racial groups, minority and majority. Section
IV will examine recent circuit court decisions that indicate a movement towards
majority support for the rejection of different standards of proof in race
discrimination cases based upon the majority or minority status of the plaintiff.
Lastly, Section V will analyze how the Supreme Court should resolve the
controversy surrounding the altered standard of proof in reverse discrimination cases.
II. TITLE VII AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
A. History and Purpose of Title VII – Protective or Remedial?10
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits public and private employers,
labor organizations, and employment agencies from discriminating in employment
on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin.11 The primary reason
Congress enacted Title VII was to provide a remedy for African Americans who
suffered from racial discrimination in employment.12 However, the purpose of Title

8

See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
9
See Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971 F.2d 585, 588 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Although it is
clear that Title VII’s protection is not limited to those individuals who are members of
historically or socially disfavored groups, [the] Supreme Court has not addressed whether the
showing required to state a prima facie case must be altered in a ‘reverse discrimination’
case.”).
10

For purposes of this Note, the term “protective” refers to the purpose behind Title VII of
ensuring that current employment decisions are made without reference to a prohibited
criterion. The terms “remedial” and “remedial purpose” refer to employment actions
specifically undertaken with a prohibited criterion in mind as a way of equalizing the
workplace for protected groups and correcting the present effects of past discrimination.
11

42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994).

12

Addressing the House of Representatives, Democrat Manny Celler proclaimed:
Mr. Chairman, what we are considering this day in effect is a bill of particulars on a
petition in the language of our Constitution for a redress of grievances. The
grievances are real and genuine, the proof is in, the gathering of evidence has gone on
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VII was to ensure that all employment decisions were made based on an individual’s
qualifications rather than a prohibited factor.13 Though Congress may have intended
Title VII to effectuate a national policy of equality in employment, by failing to
provide a statutory definition of discrimination, federal courts were left to define the
parameters of unlawful discrimination through societal perceptions of equality.14
Liberal construction of Title VII during the first decade of its enforcement led to
the emergence of two views of equality: equal treatment and equal opportunity.15
Under the equal treatment view of equality, similarly qualified individual employees
should be treated the same by an employer regardless of the employee’s race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. Accordingly, equal treatment focuses on the fairness
to the individual instead of fairness to the protected group of which the individual is
a member.16 In contrast, under the equal opportunity conception of equality, it is
sometimes appropriate for an employer to consider the race or sex of an employee in
order to remedy the past and continuing effects of race or sex discrimination in the
workplace.17 Equal opportunity therefore focuses on the fairness to the protected
group to which an individual is a member and attempts to eradicate disproportionate
representation of protected groups.18
Recognizing these competing views of equality, in 1977 the Supreme Court
clarified two basic theories of discrimination under which employment
for over a century. The legislation before you seeks only to honor the constitutional
guarantees of equality under the law for all. It bestows no preference on any one
group; what it does is to place into balance the scales of justice so that the living force
of our Constitution shall apply to all people, not only to those who by accident of birth
were born with white skins … Both parties joined hands.
CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE 104 (1985).
13

“What the bill does…is simply make it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in
denying employment. It provides that men and women shall be employed on the basis of their
qualifications, not as Catholic citizens, not as Protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as
colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States.” 110 CONG. REC. 13088 (1964) (remarks
of Senator Humphrey).
14
A memorandum entered into the Congressional Record by Senators Case and Clark, cosponsors of Title VII, states that: “[t]o discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a
difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor
which are prohibited by section 704 are those which are based on any five of the forbidden
criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.” 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
15

See Robert Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing
Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REV. 531, 538-42 (1981).
16

Id. at 540.

17

Id. at 541.

18

Much of the equal opportunity interpretation of Title VII came from decisions of the
Fourth and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, aptly characterized as the “Southern jurisprudence”
of Title VII. In leading the attack on segregated employment systems, the Fourth and Fifth
circuits impacted other circuit court judges who “seemed to defer informally to their
counterparts in the south who had intimately experienced the relationship between racial
prejudice and employment practices.” Alfred A. Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System
and the Southern Jurisprudence of Employment Discrimination, 6 INDUS. REL. L. J. 313, 34042 (1984).
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discrimination disputes are currently classified – disparate treatment and disparate
impact.19 Under disparate treatment discrimination, the employer treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin.20 Echoing the sentiments of the equal treatment view of equality, disparate
treatment focuses on intentional discrimination in the workplace against an
individual; therefore, the claimant must provide proof of an employer’s
discriminatory motivation.21 Conversely, disparate impact discrimination focuses on
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but, in fact, fall more harshly on one group than another without a proper business
justification.22 Unlike disparate treatment claims, proof of discriminatory motivation
is not required for a successful disparate impact claim.23 Echoing the sentiments of
the equal opportunity view of equality, the disparate impact theory holds an
employer liable where specific employment practices unwillingly perpetuate
discrimination and segregation of protected groups.24 As a result, the focal point of
19
See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
20

Id.

21

The necessity of providing proof of discriminatory intent comes from judicial
interpretation of the “because of” language contained in Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII:
Sec. 703 [42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2]. Unlawful employment practices.
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Belton, supra note 15, at 540; see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973).
22

Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.

23

The non-necessity of providing proof of discriminatory intent comes from judicial
interpretation of the “deprive[s] or tend[s] to deprive” language contained in Section 703(a)(2)
of Title VII:
Sec. 703 [42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2]. Unlawful employment practices.
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Belton, supra note 15, at 541; see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982).
24

Examples of employment practices which can operate to discriminate against protected
groups include the use of: performance tests, probationary periods, informal or casual
interviews, unscored application forms, training programs, and educational or work experience
requirements.
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disparate impact is upon the treatment of protected groups rather than treatment of an
individual claimant.25
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the underlying theories of equality
embodied in Title VII signifies that it perceives anti-discrimination legislation as
protecting all individuals against employment decisions that are based on factors
other than an individual’s qualifications. However, the Court has also recognized a
remedial purpose to Title VII that allows an employer to consider a prohibited factor
in addition to job qualifications when making an employment decision. The Court
envisioned this purpose through its interpretation of language contained in Section
703(j) of Title VII.26 In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, the Supreme
Court stated that “the natural inference [in the language of Section 703(j)] is that
Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action
programs.”27 While the Court specifically refused to define in detail what constitutes
permissible or impermissible affirmative action,28 a number of factors were outlined.
Under Weber, a race-conscious program is permissive if it: (1) aims at breaking
down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy; (2) responds to a manifest
racial imbalance; (3) does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white
employees; and (4) is a temporary measure.29
25
See generally Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Reverse discrimination disputes are typically brought under
the disparate treatment theory of employment discrimination. Accordingly, the remainder of
this Note will focus on the traditional standard of proof necessary for a disparate treatment
claim based upon race discrimination and the adjustments made to this standard in order to
encompass reverse race discrimination claims.
26

Section 703(j) [42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(j)] provides:
Nothing contained in [Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any employer … to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons
of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer … in
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in
the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area. (emphasis
added).
27

443 U.S. 193, 206 (1979). In holding that affirmative action programs are not prohibited
by Title VII, the Court noted that the main concern of Congress in enacting Title VII was to
“relieve the plight of the Negro in our economy.” Id. at 202 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6548
(statement of Senator Humphrey)). Accordingly, the Court refused to agree that a private
employer could not take “effective steps to accomplish the goal that Congress designed Title
VII to achieve.” Id. at 204. Looking to the precise language of Section 703(j), the Court held
that if Congress had sought to prohibit all race-conscious efforts by employers, it could have
stated that: “nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted to permit voluntary affirmative efforts to
correct racial imbalances.” Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
28

Id. at 208.

29

Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. A lengthy dissent by Justice Rehnquist strongly disputed the
majority’s interpretation of Section 703(j). While acknowledging that “the reality of
employment discrimination against Negroes provided the primary impetus for passage of Title
VII,” Justice Rehnquist argued that “this fact by no means supports the proposition that
Congress intended to leave employers free to discriminate against white persons.” Id. at 229.
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Equipped with ambiguous guidelines, lower federal courts attempted to reconcile
reverse discrimination disputes with the proclaimed legitimacy of race-conscious
programs. The compromise achieved by some circuit courts was an adjustment to
the traditional disparate treatment evidentiary framework in cases of race
discrimination claims brought by non-minority plaintiffs.
B. Applying Title VII Protection – The McDonnell Douglas
“Burden Shifting” Analysis
To establish a traditional case of intentional discrimination under the disparate
treatment theory, plaintiffs may rely upon either direct evidence of discriminatory
intent or circumstantial evidence from which a fact-finder can infer discriminatory
intent.30 Recognizing that employers rarely leave direct “smoking gun” evidence of
discrimination, the Supreme Court established a framework for determining the
existence of prohibited discrimination on the basis of indirect evidence.31 Under this
framework, an inference of discriminatory intent will arise in a racial discrimination
dispute when a plaintiff establishes: (1) that he belongs to a racial minority; (2) that
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (3) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) that after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Predicting the quandary of reverse discrimination, Justice
Rehnquist concluded his dissent by noting that “[b]y going not merely beyond, but directly
against Title VII’s language and legislative history, the Court has sown the wind … [l]ater
courts will face the impossible task of reaping the whirlwind.” Id. at 255 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
30

United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983).

31

See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff in
McDonnell Douglas was a black male who worked for the defendant – an aerospace and
aircraft manufacturer – for eight years as a mechanic and laboratory technician until he was
laid off during the course of a general work-force reduction. Id. at 794. A long-time activist
in the civil rights movement, the plaintiff protested that his discharge, as well as the
defendant’s general hiring practice, was racially motivated. Id. As part of his protest, the
plaintiff and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality (“CORE”) illegally stalled
their cars on the main roads leading to the defendant’s plant specifically for the purpose of
blocking access to it during the morning shift change. Id. After the police were called and the
plaintiff refused to move his car voluntarily, his car was towed and he was arrested and fined
for obstructing traffic. Id. at 795. Sometime after the “stall-in,” a “lock-in” also took place at
the plant whereby a chain and padlock was placed on the front door of one of defendant’s
buildings, preventing the employees from leaving. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 795.
Although the extent of the plaintiff’s involvement in the “lock-in” was uncertain, he
apparently knew beforehand of the plans. Id. Three weeks after this event, the defendant
publicly advertised for qualified mechanics and plaintiff promptly applied for re-employment.
Id. at 796. The defendant rejected the plaintiff’s application, basing its decision on the
plaintiff’s participation in the “stall-in” and “lock-in.” Id. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed
a formal complaint with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, alleging that the
defendant’s refusal to rehire him was based on his race and his involvement in the civil rights
movement. Id. After the EEOC unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the dispute, the plaintiff
initiated a civil action in federal court. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 797. The Court of
Appeals reversed the dismissal of the district court based upon a standard of proof different
than that applied by the district court and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 797-98.
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from persons of his qualifications.32 The relatively relaxed standard of indirect
evidence required at the prima facie stage of litigation in a disparate treatment case is
specifically designed to enable the plaintiff to proceed past the summary judgment
stage, while providing the plaintiff with time in which to gather the necessary
evidence of discriminatory intent.33
By establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff in a Title VII action creates a
rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the
plaintiff.34 An employer can overcome this presumption by articulating a
“legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for its rejection of the plaintiff.35 Following
the employer’s articulation of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions,
the plaintiff is afforded a fair opportunity to prove that the employer’s reasons are
merely a “pretext” for discrimination.36 To prove that an employer’s proffered
reason is a pretext for racial discrimination, the plaintiff must do more than simply
refute the employer’s reason – the plaintiff must also present evidence of
discriminatory intent.37 This may be established through (1) direct evidence of racial
animus (such as statements that the plaintiff is being fired because of his race or
other statements revealing racial bias); (2) comparative evidence that persons of a
different race than plaintiff but with similar employment records were retained while
plaintiff was not; or, (3) statistical evidence showing that the employer has a pattern
or practice of discrimination against persons of plaintiff’s race.38
Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm to a “traditional”
race discrimination case reveals that a claimant in such a case is not required to
prove an employer’s discriminatory animus at the prima facie stage of litigation.
Rather, evidence that would suffice to establish intent to discriminate is reserved for

32

Id. at 802.

33

See Transworld Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (“The shifting burdens of
proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the plaintiff has his day in
court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.”).
34

Texas Dep’t. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); see also
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (a “prima facie case [under
McDonnell Douglas] raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these
acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors”.).
35

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The employer’s articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is part of the “burden shifting” process outlined in McDonnell Douglas
which begins with the plaintiff establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. The
employer’s evidentiary burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is a
burden of production, not one of persuasion – the only requirement being that evidence must
be admissible. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
36

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The plaintiff’s evidentiary burden of showing
“pretext” is a burden of persuasion rather than one of production and the plaintiff carries the
ultimate burden of persuading the fact-finder that he was the victim of discrimination.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
37

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257.

38

Bailey v. MCI Telecommunications, 1982 WL 31073, *2 (D. D.C.); see also McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 334-36.
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the “pretext” stage of litigation. Until the rise of reverse discrimination claims,
lower federal courts assumed that the rationale behind the “presumption” of racial
discrimination at the prima facie stage of litigation was based upon the claimant’s
status as a racial “minority.”39
III. THE RISE OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
A. Modification of the McDonnell Douglas Paradigm – The Burden
of Background Circumstances
Under a literal reading of the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas, a
white plaintiff could never avail himself of Title VII race protection, since he could
never meet the first element of the prima facie case – namely, “that he belongs to a
racial minority.”40 Accordingly, the solution for some federal courts was to modify
the traditional McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard in cases of reverse racial
discrimination.41
Courts that support a modified prima facie standard for majority plaintiffs do so
based upon language contained in McDonnell Douglas which implied that the prima
facie criteria for evaluating claims of discrimination should be flexibly applied to
accommodate the facts of the particular case at hand.42 Thus, while McDonnell

39

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was the first
federal court to articulate this rationale in the reverse discrimination context in the seminal
case of Parker v. The Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In
stating that “membership in a socially disfavored group was the assumption on which the
entire McDonnell Douglas analysis was predicated,” the court held that “the light of common
experience” would only permit a fact-finder to infer racial discrimination where the plaintiff
belongs to a racial minority. Id. at 1017. The Supreme Court, however, has never articulated
this rationale. The “light of common experience” language quoted in Parker was based upon
that court’s interpretation of a general statement found in Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978), wherein the Supreme Court stated that “[a] prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts,
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors.” See Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017. However, the Supreme Court’s language in Furnco
was not meant to be limited to any particular racial group. Rather, the Court was emphasizing
how, in a business setting, people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner and without any
underlying reasons. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. Therefore, the Court held that when all
legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated, it is more likely than not
that the employer, who is generally assumed to act only with some reason, based his decision
on an impermissible consideration such as race. Id.
40

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

41

See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text for a detailed analysis of this modified
standard.
42

See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 (“The facts necessarily will vary in Title
VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.”); see also Furnco, 438
U.S. at 577 (“The method suggested in McDonnell Douglas for pursuing this inquiry … was
never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly
way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question
of discrimination.”).
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Douglas was a “refusal to hire” claim based on race discrimination, the second, third
and fourth prongs of the prima facie standard have been adjusted to accommodate
cases of discriminatory demotions,43 discharges,44 and refusals to promote.45
Similarly, the first prong and second prongs have been adjusted to accommodate
sexual discrimination claims, requiring that a female plaintiff demonstrate only that
she is a qualified woman.46
These adjustments clearly reflect judicial recognition that alteration of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is necessary as a means of accommodating
varying factual situations in the workplace.
Less clear, however, is an
acknowledgment that the McDonnell Douglas standard should be altered to allow for
different treatment of racial groups merely because the particular plaintiff in
McDonnell Douglas happened to be identified as a member of a racial minority.
Nevertheless, many federal courts embraced the idea that the racial status of the
plaintiff would determine the appropriate standard of proof.47
The District of Columbia Circuit has been the leading adherent for the imposition
of a different burden of proof for plaintiffs who are white or male than for their nonwhite or female counterparts.48 In Parker v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company49 – the leading case on reverse discrimination – the court articulated a
newly minted “background circumstances” requirement for cases of reverse
discrimination.50 This test requires the plaintiff to provide evidence at the prima
facie stage of litigation that “background circumstances support the suspicion that
the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”51
In Parker, the plaintiff was a white male employed as a conductor and trainman
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.52 From 1975 to 1978, he actively sought a
transfer or a promotion to the position of locomotive fireman.53 After minorities and
women were repeatedly transferred to the position under a preferential “Seniority
Modification Agreement,”54 the plaintiff filed a race and gender discrimination
43

See generally Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1992).

44

See generally McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).

45

See generally Smith v. Horner, 839 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1988).

46

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.6.

47

See infra notes 100-141 and accompanying text for a breakdown of the positions taken
by each of the federal circuits.
48

Douglas L. Williams, Update to Developments in Race and Age Discrimination, SC63
ALI-ABA 109, 111 (1998).
49

652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

50

Id. at 1017.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 1013.

53

Id.

54

The “Seniority Modification Agreement” was an agreement between the defendant
employer and unions representing its employees which permitted preferential transfers for
eligible minorities and women without any corresponding loss of seniority. Parker, 652 F.2d
at 1015.
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lawsuit.55 In support of his claims, the plaintiff relied upon an affidavit by his
employer acknowledging that the company “has engaged in affirmative action … to
overcome the under-utilization of minorities and women in various jobs.”56 At the
time that Parker instituted his action, the Supreme Court had yet to issue a ruling on
the legitimacy of affirmative action.57 However, during discovery proceedings the
Supreme Court issued its decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber58 and
the plaintiff was permitted to file an amended complaint challenging the validity of
the defendant employer’s alleged affirmative action plan.59
After finding that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to the
defendant employer on the basis of conclusory statements regarding the existence of
an affirmative action plan, the Court of Appeals proceeded to analyze the employer’s
hiring decision from the context of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard.60
Discussing the “four-prong” test for a traditional prima facie showing of race
discrimination,61 the court theorized that the minimal requirements under McDonnell
Douglas were not designed to be “an arbitrary lightening of the plaintiff’s burden,
but rather a procedural embodiment of the recognition that our nation has not yet
freed itself from a legacy of hostile discrimination.”62 On the basis of this reasoning,
as well as the court’s analysis of what the McDonnell Douglas presumption of
discrimination was predicated upon,63 the Parker court decided that the first element
of the McDonnell Douglas test required modification in cases of reverse
discrimination.64 Under this modification, Mr. Parker was required to show
“background circumstances that the defendant is that unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority” in lieu of the traditional requirement of
membership in a minority group.65
55

Id. at 1013.

56

Id. at 1015.

57

Id. at 1013. However, the Supreme Court’s ruling in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), was issued five years prior to the Parker decision and
confirmed that Title VII protects white persons from discrimination under the same standards
employed to protect non-whites. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text for a detailed
discussion of this ruling.
58

443 U.S. 193 (1979). See supra note 29 and accompanying text for an outline of the
factors the Court considers when evaluating the legitimacy of affirmative action plans.
59

Parker, 652 F.2d at 1013.

60

Id. at 1016.

61

See supra note 32 and accompanying text for the McDonnell Douglas “four-prong”
standard.
62

Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017.

63

See supra note 39.

64

Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017. See also supra note 42 (outlining the authority the court relied
upon in determining that the McDonnell Douglas standard was intended to be modified in
order to accommodate different fact situations).
65

The court recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald made it
indisputable that whites were also a protected group under Title VII; however, the court
believed that “it defied common sense to suggest that the promotion of a black employee
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Twelve years later, the court was called upon to clarify the Parker standard of
background circumstances in Harding v. Gray.66 After stating that the background
circumstances test was not designed to disadvantage white plaintiffs,67 the Harding
court nevertheless required additional “suspicious” evidence from majority plaintiffs
other than race, qualification, and rejection – the three factors that a minority
plaintiff would be required to show.68 The court then surveyed the evidence it had
found in the past to constitute background circumstances and specified two distinct
categories of evidence necessary for majority plaintiffs to meet their prima facie
case. The first is evidence indicating that the particular employer at issue has some
reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against whites.69 The second is
evidence indicating that there is something “fishy” about the facts of the case at hand
that raises an inference of discrimination.70 In Mr. Harding’s case, his allegations of
superior qualifications granted him a stay from the district court’s summary
judgment ruling on the condition that, on remand, the court would be satisfied that
there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether Mr. Harding’s qualifications were in
fact superior to those of the minority promotee.71
Both the Parker and Harding courts recognized that background circumstances
sufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination could include proof that the
defendant company has unlawfully considered race as a factor in its employment and
promotion decisions in the past72 and that the majority plaintiff has superior
qualifications.73 However, the Harding court’s insistence that the background
circumstances requirement is not an additional hurdle for white plaintiffs74 resonates
as an ill-conceived effort to disguise the infirmities of the standard.
The most obvious problem with the background circumstances test is that it
creates a standard of proof that is undeniably higher for one group of persons as
opposed to another – a result directly opposed to the “equal treatment” purpose
justifies an inference of prejudice against white co-workers in our present society.” Parker,
652 F.2d at 1017.
66

9 F.3d 150 (1993).

67

Id. at 153.

68

Id.

69

Id. The court cited previous cases in the District of Columbia Circuit to illustrate what
types of evidence would satisfy this category. Examples included: over-representation of
minority promotees; minority supervisors and a proposed affirmative action plan (along with
other factors); or pressure on the hiring authority to hire minorities and a proposed affirmative
action plan.
70

Id. Examples of evidence which would satisfy this category included: allegations of a
“scheme” to fix performance ratings; a majority plaintiff who is given little or no
consideration for a promotion and a supervisor who never fully reviewed the qualifications of
a minority promotee; or a minority promotee who is less qualified than several majority
candidates yet is promoted over their heads in an unprecedented fashion.
71

Harding, 9 F.3d at 154.

72

Parker, 652 F.2d at 1018.

73

Harding, 9 F.3d at 153-54.

74

Id. at 154.
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underlying Title VII.75 Majority plaintiffs must make an affirmative showing at the
outset of litigation to establish an inference of discrimination, whereas minority
plaintiffs need only point to their status as minorities. Requiring majority plaintiffs
to provide strong evidence of background circumstances of an employer’s
discriminatory practices at the early stage of litigation ignores the fact that a
McDonnell Douglas prima facie showing does not establish discrimination.76
Rather, it was designed merely to be a tool to help the aggrieved plaintiff who lacks
direct evidence of discriminatory intent. The burden of persuasion rests at all times
with the plaintiff, who must ultimately prove intentional discrimination in order to
prevail.77 Imposition of the background circumstances test requires the majority
plaintiff to justify the McDonnell Douglas inference of discrimination by adducing
facts at the prima facie stage of litigation that normally are not required until the
“pretext” stage of litigation.78 His minority counterpart on the other hand, does not
have to justify his receipt of the McDonnell Douglas inference.
Although created against the backdrop of affirmative action legislation, the
background circumstances test strays too far afield in its protection of the “equal
opportunity” rationale of Title VII.79
Race-conscious programs, when validly
created, are effectively safeguarded even in the absence of a background
circumstances test because the existence of such a program provides the employer
with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.80 If such a plan is
articulated as the basis for the employer’s decision, the burden then shifts to the
majority plaintiff to prove that the employer’s justification is pretextual and that the
plan is invalid. If the plaintiff does not carry this burden, his suit will be dismissed.81
In light of the difficulty a majority plaintiff encounters when attempting to prove the
invalidity of an affirmative action program, the additional burden of a modified
prima facie standard effectively forecloses the majority plaintiff from exercising
legitimate rights under Title VII.
The Harding court’s statement that the background circumstances test does not
impose a more onerous burden upon majority plaintiffs than that imposed upon their
minority counterparts fails to take into account how the same evidence produced by
each group will render different results.82 For instance, the Harding court recognized
that a majority plaintiff’s allegation of superior qualifications would be a sufficient
showing of background circumstances to support an inference of discrimination.83
However, under the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, minority plaintiffs

75

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

76

See generally St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

77

Id. at 511.

78

See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.

79

See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.

80

Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987).

81

Id.

82

Harding, 9 F.3d at 154.

83

Id. at 153-54.
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merely have to show that they were qualified for the position, not that their
qualifications were superior to those of the person who received the position.
Under the Parker court’s reasoning, proof that the defendant employer has
unlawfully considered race as a factor in its past employment and promotion
decisions can raise an inference of discrimination for the majority plaintiff.84 Aside
from the vagueness of this standard, it imposes a burden upon majority plaintiffs in
much the same way as the “superior qualifications” standard does. Not only is the
sufficiency of the factual showing uncertain, majority plaintiffs are required to show
a pattern of discrimination against other majority class members in order to satisfy
the background circumstances standard. Conversely, minority plaintiffs merely have
to point to their status as a minority to raise an inference of individual discriminatory
treatment – evidence of past discrimination against other minority class members
merely strengthens the inference.
To justify this burden on majority plaintiffs, courts must believe that Title VII
only protects whites and males as a group rather than as individuals – a result
inconsistent with the language of Title VII, which prohibits discrimination against an
individual “because of” a protected trait.85 Title VII clearly recognizes that an
individual plaintiff can be a victim of discrimination even though the defendant
employer has not discriminated against members of his class in the past.86 The
background circumstances test fails to account for this possibility.
B. Recognizing the Rights of Majority Plaintiffs – McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Company
When the District of Columbia Circuit developed the background circumstances
test in 1981, strong statements from the Supreme Court admonishing discriminatory
preferences for any racial group were already on record.87 The Court also had the
opportunity to analyze Title VII in the context of a reverse discrimination claim prior
to the Parker decision. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company,88
the Court emphasized its belief that while the legislative history of Title VII
underscored the need to provide increased employment opportunities to minority
persons, the neutral language of the statute revealed that the scope of the Act was
intended to reach persons of all races, including non-minorities.89
84

Parker, 652 F.2d at 1018.

85

See supra note 21.

86

See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-55 (1982) (finding that, in enacting
Title VII, Congress did not intend to allow discrimination against some employees on the
basis of race or gender merely because the employer treated other members of the same group
favorably. “The principle focus of the statute is the protection of the individual employee,
rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole.”).
87

See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) (“It is clear beyond
cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each
applicant regardless of race and without regard to whether members of the applicant’s race are
already proportionately represented in the work force.”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971) (“Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely
and only what Congress has proscribed.”).
88

427 U.S. 273 (1976).

89

Id. at 278-80.
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In McDonald, two white employees and a black employee were charged with
misappropriating cargo that their employer was carrying for a customer.90 Six days
later, the white employees were fired; however, the black employee was retained.91
After union grievance proceedings secured no relief, the employees filed complaints
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, charging their employer with
discrimination on the basis of race.92 Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the Court
held that the language in Title VII prohibiting the discharge of “any individual”
because of “such individual’s race,” was not meant to be limited to discrimination
against any one particular race.93 Rather, the plain meaning of the language, as
interpreted by the EEOC, proscribes racial discrimination against whites on the same
terms as racial discrimination against non-whites.94
Because the defendant employer did not contend that its actions were based upon
an affirmative action plan, the Court did not have to address the permissibility of
such a plan. However, the Court clearly rejected the defendant employer’s
arguments that “discrimination [in favor of minorities] in isolated cases which cannot
reasonably be said to burden whites as a class unduly … may be acceptable.”95 In
addition to quoting language from its previous decision in Griggs v. Duke Power
Company,96 the Court stated that the EEOC, whose interpretations of Title VII were
afforded great deference, has consistently held that failure to proscribe racial
discrimination in private employment against whites on the same terms as racial
discrimination against non-whites would “constitute a derogation of the
Commission’s Congressional mandate to eliminate all practices which operate to
disadvantage the employment opportunities of any group protected by Title VII,
including Caucasians.”97 The Court then permitted the reverse discrimination
plaintiffs to utilize the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to prove their
claims.
As evidence that the application of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard
was appropriate in cases of reverse discrimination, the Court stated that the
requirement in McDonnell Douglas that the plaintiff belong to a racial minority was
set out only to demonstrate the racial character of the case, and not as an indication
of any substantive limitation on Title VII’s prohibition of racial discrimination.98
Thus, the Court clearly indicated that the sole purpose of the first prong of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case was to establish that the claim was based on
race rather than sex, religion, or national origin.
90

Id. at 276.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279.

94

Id.

95

Id. at 280.

96

401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that the Act prohibits discriminatory preference for
any racial group, minority or majority).
97

McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279-80 (quoting EEOC Decision No. 74-31).

98

Id. at 279 n.6.
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Because the other three prongs of the prima facie case address the most common
reasons for an employer’s actions – lack of qualifications or lack of an open position
– a majority plaintiff who eliminates these reasons should be entitled to the same
inference of discrimination as his minority counterpart. However, courts that apply a
modified McDonnell Douglas standard assume that satisfaction of the first prong of
the prima facie case is what raises the inference of discrimination. Under this
application, however, the other elements of the prima facie case are rendered
meaningless because the requirement of showing background circumstances is really
a requirement that the plaintiff make an affirmative showing on the ultimate issue –
intentional discrimination.99
IV. REVERSE DISCRIMINATION IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS100
A. Modified Version of McDonnell Douglas Applied
Despite the flaws in the background circumstances standard, it continues to be
followed in the District of Columbia Circuit,101 the Sixth Circuit,102 and the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals.103 However, support from these courts seems to be
99

See Collins v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (D. MO. 1990).

100

There are two circuits that have yet to directly address the issue as to the proper
standard of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of reverse discrimination – the
Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. In “traditional” race discrimination cases, the Fourth
Circuit has adopted a “but for the plaintiff’s race, the plaintiff would have been promoted” test
as an alternative to the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard. See generally Holmes v.
Bevilacqua, 794 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1986). However, it has specifically declined to decide
whether a higher burden of proof applies in cases of reverse discrimination. See Lucas v.
Dole, 835 F.2d 532, 534 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying the Holmes standard and stating that
“[a]lthough the D.C. Circuit has imposed a higher prima facie burden on majority plaintiffs,
we expressly decline to decide at this time whether a higher burden applies.”); accord Weeks
v. Union Camp Corp., 215 F.3d 1323 (4th Cir. 2000). Notably, a recent district court within
the Fourth Circuit adopted the “background circumstances” test, citing two other district court
decisions from the Fourth Circuit in support of its conclusion but failing to mention the fact
that the Fourth Circuit has not affirmatively adopted the test. See Youmans v. Manna Inc., 33
F. Supp. 2d 462 (D. S.C. 1998), aff’d, 166 F.3d 337 (4th Cir.). The Ninth Circuit has
repeatedly avoided addressing the issue by dismissing several cases of reverse discrimination
on other grounds. See, e.g., Teehee v. Board of Educ., 116 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1997); Frederick
v. City of Portland, 98 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1996). But see Lemnitzer v. Philippine Airlines,
Inc., 816 F. Supp. 1441, 1448 (D. Cal. 1992) (applying the traditional McDonnell Douglas
standard because the Ninth Circuit had not explicitly adopted a modified test by which to
measure reverse discrimination claims).
101

Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788
F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Parker v. The Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
102

Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994); Murray v.
Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1985).
103

The Eighth Circuit has not actually applied the “background circumstances” test to a
Title VII action. Rather, in Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 1997), the court was
presented with the question of whether or not a McDonnell Douglas analysis could be applied
to a Bivens action for gender discrimination against the federal government. Id. at 1036. In
holding that a McDonnell Douglas standard was applicable to such a case, the court proceeded
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diminishing as exemplified by a recent Sixth Circuit decision which applied the test
while expressing serious doubts about its continued vitality.104
In Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc.,105 a white female plaintiff filed a
reverse racial discrimination claim against her employer alleging she was
constructively discharged from her position as a clerk at the defendant employer’s
racetrack.106 After aggregating excessive shortages, the defendant employer insisted
that the plaintiff sign a “shortage statement.”107 After being given the choice of
complying with Racetrack policy or forfeiting her right to work, the plaintiff refused
to sign the statement and never returned to work.108 In filing a reverse racial
discrimination suit based on constructive discharge, the plaintiff alleged that several
black clerks with similar shortages were not asked to sign “shortage statements”
because the employer feared that the black employees would claim they were targets
of discrimination.109
In assessing the plaintiff’s claims, the Sixth Circuit applied the background
circumstances requirement to the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case; however, it also modified the remaining three prongs by requiring that a
reverse discrimination plaintiff also show “that the employer treated differently
employees who were similarly situated but not members of the protected group.”110
The court’s rationale for applying this two-prong test of background circumstances
and different treatment was its belief that “the primary purpose of Title VII is to
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminating
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizens.”111
Nine years later, the Sixth Circuit confirmed that the background circumstances
standard continued to exist within the circuit, yet expressed “serious misgivings
about the soundness of a test which imposes a more onerous standard for plaintiffs
to find that the male plaintiff had established a prima facie case of gender discrimination
because he had alleged several “background circumstances” sufficient to support the suspicion
that the employer was the unusual one who discriminated against the majority. Id. at 1037.
While Duffy was not a Title VII reverse discrimination case, previous district court decisions
within the Eighth Circuit had repeatedly rejected the “background circumstances” test in cases
of reverse discrimination under Title VII. See, e.g., Collins v. School Dist. of Kansas City,
727 F. Supp. 1318, 1320-21 (D. Mo. 1990) (noting that research revealed no cases in the
Eighth Circuit which followed Parker or its progeny and that the case law from the circuit was
inconsistent with the Parker decision).
104

See Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994).

105

770 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1985).

106

Id. at 64.

107

Id. at 65. The shortage statement acknowledged that the employee had been previously
notified and warned of chronic shortages and that further shortages would clearly define
incompetence to be employed and would result in immediate dismissal.
108

Id.

109

Id. at 66.

110

Murray, 770 F.2d at 67.

111

Id. at 67 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
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who are white or male than for their non-white or female counterparts.”112 However,
the court was able to specifically avoid overruling the use of the background
circumstances standard by stating that its doubts about the test did not affect the
disposition of the case because the plaintiff had failed to meet the second prong of
different treatment for similarly situated persons.113
A major point of contention among the courts that apply the modified McDonnell
Douglas standard and those that do not is the assumption underlying the McDonnell
Douglas framework.114 The circuit courts that apply the background circumstances
test believe that membership in a disfavored group is the entire assumption upon
which the framework was established; therefore, modifications must be made for
those individuals who are not perceived as “socially disfavored.”115 However, as
noted by a district court in the Eighth Circuit, the application of the background
circumstances test would necessarily require the courts “to take on the unseemly task
of deciding which groups are socially favored and which ones are socially
disfavored.”116 Ironically, the originator of the background circumstances test – the
District of Columbia circuit – predicted this dilemma by noting that “whites are in
the minority in the District of Columbia.”117
Logically, if a racial “minority” constitutes a racial “majority” in a particular
locality, the “traditionally disfavored” presumption should not be applicable. Under
such circumstances, it becomes clear that a rigid application of differing standards of
proof based upon such flexible concepts as “minority” or “majority” status produces
inequitable results. Continuing to apply standards of proof based upon a concept
such as which groups have been “traditionally disfavored” is equally dangerous in
that it blinds society to the reality of which groups are currently experiencing
unfavorable treatment.118 This danger was recognized over 100 years ago by Justice
Harlan, who stated that “when a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there
must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of mere
citizen, and ceases to be a special favorite of the laws.”119 Regardless of whether or
not that day has arrived, permitting the imposition of a higher standard of proof for
112

Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994).

113

Id.

114

See, e.g., Collins v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (D. Mo.

1990).
115

See supra note 39.

116

Collins v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1322 (D. Mo. 1990).

117

Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Of course
whites are in the minority in the District of Columbia, but neither this court nor the Supreme
Court has squarely addressed the issue whether minority status for purposes of a prima facie
case could have a regional or local meaning.”).
118

But see Ronald Walters, Affirmative Action and the Politics of Concept Appropriation,
38 HOW. L.J. 587, 604 (1995) (asserting that there is no danger of white males becoming an
oppressed class as they have suffered little from affirmative action while black socioeconomic status remains worse than that of whites).
119

United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 61 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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majority plaintiffs based upon their failure to be a “historically disfavored” group is
an inequitable assumption about modern society.
In contrast, courts that refuse to apply the background circumstances test do so
by recognizing that the McDonnell Douglas framework is a “procedural embodiment
of the recognition that employment discrimination is difficult to prove with only
circumstantial evidence.”120 According to this rationale, the entire McDonnell
Douglas framework exists because plaintiffs rarely have direct evidence of
discriminatory intent. If plaintiffs were forced to rely only upon circumstantial
evidence, they would never receive a fair opportunity to obtain the protection that
Title VII guarantees. To remedy this inequity, the McDonnell Douglas indirect
evidence framework was designed as a means of creating a presumption of
discrimination and forcing the employer to come forward with a legitimate
explanation for his conduct.121
By eliminating the presumption for majority plaintiffs absent a showing of
background circumstances, an employer is no longer forced to come forward with a
legitimate justification for certain actions. This raises the danger that employers will
become free to discriminate against individual majority plaintiffs if the employer has
not discriminated against other persons similarly situated in the past and if the
plaintiff is unable to come up with direct evidence of the discriminatory treatment.
Rejecting the requirement of background circumstances not only comports with the
true principles behind Title VII’s protection of all individuals, it also benefits the
employer by shifting the focus away from the employer’s past conduct and
concentrating on the individual case at hand.
B. Traditional McDonnell Douglas Framework Applied
Although the background circumstances test previously claimed a majority of the
circuit courts, opposition to Parker and its progeny has continued to rise. Currently,
the First,122 Second,123 Third,124 Fifth,125 and Eleventh Circuits126 wholly reject the
120

See, e.g., Collins, 727 F. Supp. at 1321 (referring to statements made by the Supreme
Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985)).
121

Id. at 1322.

122

See, e.g., Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hospital, 156 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1998) (where the
court applied a “membership in a protected class” standard to the first prong of the McDonnell
Douglas framework and found that a male plaintiff had established a prima facie case of
reverse gender discrimination by showing that he had a satisfactory job performance record
but was terminated and replaced by a woman – the plaintiff’s status as a male constituted
membership in the protected class of gender); see also Eastridge v. Rhode Island College, 996
F. Supp. 161, 166 (D. R.I. 1998).
(“This court opts not to follow [the background circumstance] modification of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie elements for reverse discrimination cases, because
requiring a reverse discrimination plaintiff to show that the specific employer has
displayed a pattern of discrimination against the majority in the past imposes a more
onerous burden on such a plaintiff as compared to any plaintiff from any protected
group. This is antagonistic to the very purposes of Title VII itself.”).
123
See Vallone v. Lori’s Natural Food Center, Inc., 1999 WL 1012668, *1 (2nd Cir.)
(“This Court has applied the same burden-shifting to claims of “regular” discrimination — i.e.,
where the plaintiff is a member of a historically disfavored group — as well as to claims of
reverse discrimination — i.e., where the plaintiff is not a member of a historically disfavored
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Parker court’s modification of the McDonnell Douglas standard. In doing so, these
courts apply a standard consistent with the letter and intent of Title VII, requiring
only that the plaintiff prove membership in a protected class – namely “race.”
Although showing protected class membership rather than minority status is a
modification to the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas standard, unlike the
background circumstances modification it does not impose an additional burden
upon majority plaintiffs. Rather, ensuring that a plaintiff is a member of a protected
class equalizes the respective racial groups under Title VII; therefore, it is viewed as
a “traditional” application of McDonnell Douglas. Ironically, the rationale behind
applying the “protected class” element to the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case is the same rationale that supported the background circumstances
change – the Supreme Court’s language in McDonnell Douglas regarding the
flexibility of the prongs to accommodate different factual situations.127
The greatest damage to the background circumstances test came from a standard
set forth within the Eleventh Circuit;128 however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
with its September 1999 decision in Iadimarco v. Runyon,129 outlined the most
group.”); see also Ticali v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 41 F. Supp. 2d 249, 261 (D.
N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 201 F.3d 432 (2nd Cir.) (stating that the court will look to whether or not an
inference can be drawn from the established facts that the employer treated the plaintiff less
favorably because of his race) (emphasis added).
124

See generally Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999).

125

See generally Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1990); Ulrich v. Exxon
Co., 824 F. Supp. 677 (D. Tex. 1993). Although a recent decision from the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals conclusively established that the standard within the circuit is the “protected class”
approach, this was not always the case. In Byers v. The Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d
419 (5th Cir. 2000), the court held that in order for a white male plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case of reverse race discrimination, he must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected
group; (2) he was qualified for the position held; (3) he was discharged from the position; and
(4) he was replaced by someone outside of the protected group. Id. at 426. However, the
court noted that previous Fifth Circuit cases were in conflict regarding the first prong. “Some
Fifth Circuit cases require that a plaintiff be a member of a “racial minority within the
company” … [o]ther cases require only that the plaintiff be a member of “a protected group,”
meaning a group protected under Title VII.” Id. The defendant in Byers argued that the
plaintiff failed to satisfy the first prong of the prima facie case because he was not part of a
racial minority at his place of work since, throughout his employment, the majority of
employees and managers were White. Id. However, the Court of Appeals chose to apply the
“protected group” requirement to the first prong, stating that its decision in Singh v. Shoney’s,
Inc., 64 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1995), “marks a retreat from the “racial minority” requirement to
the “protected group” requirement for cases of reverse discrimination.” Id.
126
See generally Shealy v. City of Albany, 89 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Bailey,
934 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1991).
127

See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

128
See Shealy v. City of Albany, 89 F.3d 804, 805 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie test in cases of reverse discrimination requires the plaintiff to
prove merely: (1) that he belongs to a class; (2) that he applied for and was qualified for a job;
(3) that he was rejected for the job; and (4) that the job was filled by a minority group member
or a woman) (emphasis added); accord Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1991).
129

190 F.3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999). See supra note 2 for an outline of the facts in Iadimarco.
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logical test for analyzing reverse discrimination disputes. Referring to the
background circumstances test as an attempt to “cram” reverse discrimination cases
into the McDonnell Douglas framework,130 the Iadimarco court refused to apply a
standard it thought would initially force the plaintiff to present proof which would
only become relevant to rebut the employer’s explanation of the challenged
conduct.131 The court feared that the Parker/Harding modification would undermine
the basic point of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting regime – to make it easier
for employees to bring claims that would otherwise be extraordinarily difficult to
prove.132 The court then chastised the background circumstances standard as being
“irremediably vague and ill-defined.”133 Drawing upon language from the Supreme
Court,134 the Iadimarco court held that all that should be required to establish a prima
facie case in the context of reverse discrimination is for the plaintiff to present
sufficient evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude that the employer is treating
some people differently than others based upon a trait that it protected under Title
VII.135
The Iadimarco decision unexpectedly strengthened the position of majority
plaintiffs in that the court’s commitment to equal treatment among all racial groups
resulted in an abrogation of previous rulings within the Third Circuit.136 Despite this
130

Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 158.

131

Id. at 161.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

The court quoted Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252
(1980) (“the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas merely states the basic allocations of
burdens and order or presentation of proof under Title VII”) and Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
(“it raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if
otherwise unexplained in the context of the prongs of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors … [h]owever, the central focus of the inquiry is always whether the employer
is treating some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin”.). Id. at 160.
135

Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 161.

136

Prior to the Iadimarco decision, district courts within the Third Circuit operated under
the Parker/Harding premise that a plaintiff’s burden of persuasion must be applied differently
in suits alleging reverse discrimination. See, e.g., Harel v. Rutgers, 5 F. Supp. 2d 246 (D. N.J.
1998) (applying the “background circumstances” test to a reverse gender discrimination suit
brought by a male plaintiff); Davis v. Sheraton Soc’y Hill Hotel, 907 F. Supp. 896 (D. Pa.
1995) (same); Wallick v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 1991 WL 635610 (D. N.J.) (same).
The Parker/Harding line of reasoning was applied by the district court in Iadimarco, resulting
in a grant of summary judgment for the defendant. Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 151. Prior to its
analysis of the case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he District Court
correctly noted that we have not yet decided upon the proper expression of a prima facie case
in “reverse discrimination” cases … [a]ccordingly, we take this opportunity to provide
guidance for the trial courts in this Circuit.” Id. at 157. The circuit court’s subsequent
rejection of the “background circumstances” test operated to reverse the grant of summary
judgment and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 151.
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intra-circuit turnaround, the standard enunciated in Iadimarco is entirely consistent
with Title VII jurisprudence in that it recognizes that a Caucasian is covered under
the Act based upon a trait specifically recognized – race. Like any other Title VII
plaintiff, a majority plaintiff must still present sufficient evidence to allow a
reasonable fact finder to conclude that the defendant treated the plaintiff less
favorably than others “because of” his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff’s race is classified as “Caucasian,” rather
than some other racial classification, does not operate as an automatic bar to
satisfying the prima facie case.
Although employers may fear that a blanket rejection of the background
circumstances standard subjects them to instantaneous liability the moment they
institute voluntary affirmative action programs, such fears are unfounded. Allowing
a majority plaintiff to state a prima facie case by showing membership in a protected
class will not discourage voluntary affirmative action programs any more than the
passing of anti-discrimination legislation would prevent an employer from expanding
its workforce. On the contrary, an unmodified McDonnell Douglas standard for
majority plaintiffs fulfills the legacy of Title VII by ensuring that employers become
conscious of the legitimacy of their actions. Provided an employer’s voluntary
affirmative action plan is undertaken based upon actual disparities in its workforce,
the employer should not fear being held liable for reverse discrimination. While a
majority plaintiff will be able to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case in
the same manner as his minority counterpart, he will still have the heavy burden of
proving that the affirmative action plan was a pretext for invidious discrimination
before he can prevail.
C. An Alternative Approach
Halfway between an application of the background circumstances test in cases of
reverse discrimination and an application of the unmodified McDonnell Douglas
prima facie standard is an approach advanced by the Tenth Circuit in Notari v.
Denver Water Department.137 Stating that the McDonnell Douglas presumption of
discrimination is valid for a reverse discrimination claimant only where the requisite
background circumstances exist; the Notari court went on to hold that a claimant’s
failure to meet this burden would not end the court’s inquiry.138 Admitting that a
given employer may discriminate against an individual white worker even where no
evidence demonstrates that the employer is the unusual one who discriminates
against the majority, the court stated that an additional opportunity must be available
to the reverse discrimination claimant in order to prevent a result “untenable and
inconsistent with the goals of Title VII.”139 Under the “additional opportunity”
137

971 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992). The Notari court adopted the causation-style standard
articulated by the Fourth Circuit in “traditional” race discrimination cases. See supra note 100
and accompanying text.
138

Notari, 971 F.2d at 589 (“We also must decide whether a reverse discrimination
plaintiff’s failure to allege background circumstances necessarily compels a conclusion that he
has failed to state a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. . . . [w]e hold that it does
not.”).
139

Id. at 590. In reaching this conclusion, the court hypothesized the existence of two
similarly victimized employees, one black and one white, who only have persuasive indirect
evidence to support their claims of racial discrimination. Id. at 589. The court stated that the
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approach, a reverse discrimination plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of
disparate treatment under Title VII “by direct evidence of discrimination or by
indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable probability that, but for the
plaintiff’s status, the challenged employment decision would have favored the
plaintiff.”140
However, the court was quick to emphasize that a reverse
discrimination plaintiff who uses this method in place of the background
circumstances test is still not entitled to rely upon the presumption of discrimination
that is implicit in the traditional McDonnell Douglas analysis.141
The Notari approach has most recently been adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
Mills v. Health Care Service Corporation,142 a gender discrimination action brought
by male plaintiffs. Echoing the sentiments of the Parker and Harding courts, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the Parker and Notari approaches are not meant to
foreclose pursuit of legitimate Title VII claims by white plaintiffs because nothing in
the modified prima facie formulations alters the fact that a majority plaintiff can
always use direct evidence of discrimination to defeat a summary judgment
motion.143 However, the court acknowledged that where the majority plaintiff has
only indirect evidence of illegal discrimination and has failed to establish a prima
facie case under the background circumstances approach, he would then be required
to produce “other indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable probability
that, but for his status as a white male, the challenged employment decision would
not have occurred.”144
Proponents of the Notari standard admit that the burden of proof for majority
plaintiffs continues to be higher than that applied to their minority counterparts, yet
assert that the effect of this alternative approach is to “ameliorate the
inconsistencies” resulting from the elevated Parker standard.145 However, it would
be a daunting task to convince a majority plaintiff that he is placed in a better
position under the Notari standard when he must twice attempt to adduce evidence,
at the prima facie stage of litigation, that is only required of his minority counterparts
at the “pretext” stage of litigation under a traditional McDonnell Douglas paradigm.
black employee’s lack of direct evidence would not be fatal to a Title VII discrimination claim
because he could easily meet the requirements of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas
by using his persuasive indirect evidence and creating an inference of discrimination. Id. In
contrast, the white employee’s lack of direct evidence automatically forecloses the use of the
McDonnell Douglas standard unless the plaintiff can show the requisite “background
circumstances.” Id. at 590. The court then noted that a failure to satisfy this requirement
would compel dismissal of the white employee’s case. Notari, 971 F.2d at 590. “Unlike the
black worker, [the white worker] will have no opportunity to use his strong indirect evidence
to convince the fact finder about the validity of his claim.” Id.
140

Id. (emphasis added).

141

Id.

142

171 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 1999).

143

Mills, 171 F.3d at 456.

144

Id.

145

See generally Brenda D. Diluigi, Note, The Notari Alternative: A Better Approach To
The Square-Peg-Round-Hole Problem Found In Reverse Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 353 (1998).
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The Notari court clearly recognized that reverse discrimination plaintiffs were being
treated inequitably under the background circumstances test. However, under its
solution of a tort-style causation theory, the majority plaintiff fares no better.
V. A PLEA TO THE SUPREME COURT
While the Supreme Court has yet to directly address the issue regarding the
proper standard of proof in cases of reverse employment discrimination, several
decisions indicate an unwillingness to impose a higher burden of proof upon
majority plaintiffs at the prima facie stage of litigation.146
Following its recognition that Title VII protects white workers in the same degree
as black workers irrespective of the “isolated” nature of the discrimination,147 the
Court had the opportunity to alter the prima facie standard for majority plaintiffs in a
case involving reverse gender discrimination but failed to do so. In Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,148 the Supreme Court specifically held
that reverse discrimination disputes arising from affirmative action programs “fit
readily within the analytical framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation
v. Green.”149 The Court analyzed the majority plaintiff’s claim under the traditional
McDonnell Douglas framework, stating that once the plaintiff established a prima
facie case that gender had been taken into account in the employer’s decision, the
burden shifted to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory rationale for its
decision.150
Rather than holding that the existence of an affirmative action program
automatically burdens the majority plaintiff with a higher standard of prima facie
proof, the Supreme Court stated that an affirmative action program merely provides
the employer with the required non-discriminatory reason for its actions.151 Once the
employer shows that the adverse action taken against the plaintiff was the result of
compliance with an affirmative action plan, the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden
of invalidating the plan in order to prove the requisite “pretext” for intentional
discrimination.152
By requiring reverse discrimination plaintiffs to “invalidate” race-conscious
programs in order to prove intentional race discrimination, the Supreme Court
clearly safeguarded minority plaintiffs’ rights under affirmative action programs.
However, the Johnson decision also carefully protected the right of majority
plaintiffs to enjoy the same day in court as their minority counterparts by declining
to modify the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. This
restrictive view of preferences that are granted on the basis of race or gender is
146

See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
147

McDonald, 427 U.S. at 280 n.8.

148

480 U.S. 616 (1987).

149

Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id.
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further reflected in the decision of Adarand Constructors, Incorporated v. Pena,153
whereby the Court subjected all federal, state and local governmental affirmative
action programs to strict scrutiny.154
Although Adarand was a challenge to a federal affirmative action program
brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment rather than a
challenge to a private affirmative action program brought under Title VII,155 much of
the language contained in the majority and concurring opinions indicate that the
Court is unlikely to make it more difficult for a majority claimant to prove
discrimination under Title VII.156 Quoting Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,157 the Court observed that “the level of
scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification operates
against a group that historically has not been subject to governmental
discrimination.”158 The Court’s continued emphasis that societal discrimination is
not an appropriate basis upon which the federal government can impose a racially
classified remedy159 indicates that the Court would be unlikely to endorse different
treatment of plaintiffs under Title VII on the basis of societal status as a majority or

153

515 U.S. 200 (1995).

154

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (“[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny.”).
155

In Adarand, a federal law required that a specific subcontracting clause be placed in
federal agency contracts. One portion of the clause provided that additional compensation
would be given to a prime contractor who hired a subcontractor that was certified as a small
business controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.” Id. at 205.
The law also required the clause to state that “the contractor shall presume that socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans,
Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans and other minorities.” Id. After the Central
Federal Lands Highway Division of the United States Department of Transportation awarded a
prime contract to Mountain Gravel & Construction Company for a highway project, Adarand
Constructors submitted the low bid on a subcontract for guardrail work. Id. However, the
subcontract was awarded to Gonzales Construction Company, which was certified as a small
business controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.” Id. Adarand
Constructors claimed that the federal government’s practice of giving general contractors on
government projects a financial incentive to hire subcontractors controlled by “socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals,” in addition to the government’s use of race-based
presumptions, discriminated on the basis of race in violation of the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204. An
affidavit submitted by Mountain Gravel’s Chief Estimator stated that Mountain Gravel would
have accepted Adarand’s low bid had it not been for the additional payment it received by
hiring Gonzales instead. Id. at 205.
156
See, e.g., id. at 224 (“[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that
person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”).
157

476 U.S. 267 (1986).

158

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 220 (quoting from Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273).

159

Id.
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minority.160 The concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas reflect a concern
that the use of racial paternalism by the government will operate as a federally
mandated perpetuation of discrimination.161
The Supreme Court’s heightened scrutiny of federal, state and local affirmative
action programs and failure to alter the prima facie elements for claims of reverse
discrimination further reflects the sentiments of Furnco Construction Corporation v.
Waters, wherein the Court stated that “the central focus of the inquiry in a case such
as this is always whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”162 When the
Supreme Court finally attempts to resolve the issue regarding what standard of prima
facie proof is required for cases of reverse discrimination under Title VII, the Court
is likely to express the same misgivings as the Sixth Circuit about imposing any
standard less than equal treatment for all protected groups.163
VI. CONCLUSION
The framework for a prima facie case of reverse employment discrimination was
first articulated in 1981 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in the seminal case of Parker v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company164 The standard of proof required by the District of Columbia modifies the
traditional McDonnell Douglas circumstantial evidence paradigm and imposes upon
majority plaintiffs the necessity of showing an employer’s background circumstances
of discrimination during the prima facie stage of litigation. Under this standard, the
traditional inference of discrimination that arises for minority plaintiffs upon
showing membership in a protected racial group does not apply to majority plaintiffs
absent some other evidence explaining why an employer would discriminate against
them. To reconcile this theory with Title VII, it must be assumed that Caucasians
and males as a group continue to represent a favored “majority” in all areas of
employment and that any historical preferences for this group continue to benefit
individual members in the same manner and degree as the group. It must further be
assumed that non-Caucasians and non-whites continue to represent disfavored
“minorities” in all areas of employment and that historical patterns of disfavor
toward the group continue to operate to the detriment of each individual minority
applicant. Such presumptions directly conflict with the intent and purpose of laws
mandating non-discrimination in employment decisions.
160

See, e.g., id. at 224 (“If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against
classifications based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge
upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a particular
group, then constitutional standards may be applied consistently.”).
161

See, e.g., id. at 239 (“To pursue the concept of racial entitlement – even for the most
admirable and benign of purposes – is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of
thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of the
government, we are just one race here. It is American.) (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 240
(“Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal
before the law.”) (Thomas, J., concurring).
162

438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.).

163

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

164

652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Recognizing that Title VII is intended to protect every individual against
workplace discrimination – even in the face of remedial measures adopted to balance
racially stratified workplaces – a growing number of lower federal courts have
rejected the District of Columbia’s imposition of an altered prima facie showing for
majority plaintiffs. Echoing the central theme of Title VII, these courts permit an
inference of discrimination to arise after any claimant, majority or minority, presents
sufficient evidence to allow a fact-finder to conclude that an employer is treating
some people less favorably than others based upon a protected trait. Joining this
splinter group, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Iadimarco v. Runyon165
correctly reasoned that requiring evidence of background circumstances at the prima
facie stage of litigation would effectively foreclose majority plaintiffs from their day
in court – a result directly in conflict with the purpose of the McDonnell Douglas
circumstantial evidence paradigm.
The conflict between the validity of voluntary, race-conscious programs and the
rights of all individuals to enjoy equal protection from discrimination has been a
source of perennial controversy for the Supreme Court. Imposing an additional
requirement upon white, male plaintiffs who attempt to establish a prima facie case
of reverse discrimination only perpetuates the controversy. While remedial
programs may be laudable and necessary in the proper situation, when the interests at
stake are balanced too heavily against those who are not beneficiaries of remedial
programs there is a special danger that the favored “majority” plaintiffs will become
the disfavored “minority” plaintiffs.
Rather than equalizing employment
opportunities among all protected classes, a higher standard of proof for one class of
plaintiffs results in a never-ending need for remedial measures by continuously
shifting the class in need of protection.
One of the primary functions of the law is to set reasonably consistent standards
by which people can adjust their legal affairs. By imposing the uncertain
requirement of background circumstances upon majority plaintiffs who claim
discrimination, inconsistent protection and inconsistent liability results. Plaintiffs
and employers are left wondering whether a judge will choose to find that the
necessary factual showing has been satisfied – a factual showing which varies
depending upon societal perceptions of discrimination. Regardless of how impartial
judges may be, when faced with a standard such as background circumstances which
permits broad discretionary power, it is difficult not to let the controversial nature of
the subject matter affect the decision-making process.
The uncontested purpose of Title VII is to make it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against any individual based upon a trait protected under Title VII.
Regardless of the “minority” or “majority” status of a plaintiff, when an employer
treats one class of persons less favorably than another class, discrimination has
occurred. To adequately balance the protective and remedial purposes of Title VII,
the Supreme Court should adopt the reasoning set forth by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals and establish a single, prima facie case for all persons discriminated against
based upon a trait protected under Title VII.
MARIA A. CITERONI
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190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999).
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